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FIG LEAF FEDERALISM AND TENTH 
AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM 
Nelson Lund* 
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence of federalism is at best 
undergoing an unfinished transformation, and is at worst just 
troubled and unsatisfying. In a little-noticed dissent in Tennessee 
v. Lane,1 Justice Scalia proposed an approach that could be gen-
eralized well beyond the specific position that he took in that 
case. Thus generalized, this approach may be understood as an 
elaboration of a proposal made by Justice O'Connor in a dissent-
ing opinion twenty years ago. If adopted by the Court, this syn-
thesis of the O'Connor and Scalia suggestions could work a real 
transformation in the Court's federalism jurisprudence, and 
without some of the potentially radical side-effects that have 
thus far made the Court timorous and inconsistent. Perhaps not 
insignificantly, I think I can describe where it might take us 
without producing a hundred page article with a thousand-odd 
footnotes. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM 
REVIVAL, AND ITS LIMITS 
Stripped to essentials, recent debates among the Justices 
about states' rights begin with two contending propositions. The 
Court's more "federalist" members insist that any doctrine that 
gives Congress plenary authority to regulate the states must be 
wrong. They often point to the Tenth Amendment, which em-
phatically confirms that the states have reserved powers un-
touched by the establishment of a limited federal government. 
Without quite disputing this claim about reserved powers, the 
Court's more "nationalist" members maintain that the Constitu-
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tion identifies very few protected spheres of state autonomy, and 
that judges should be extremely hesitant to constrain congres-
sional power except where the Constitution provides very clear 
guidance. 
In the 1985 Garcia decision, the nationalist position pre-
vailed by a vote of 5-4. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion held 
that the states must look to the political process, rather than to 
the courts, for protection from excessive federal regulation.2 Ap-
parently recognizing that the political process might fail in some 
unexpected way, however, the majority left open the possibility 
(albeit a seemingly remote possibility) that the Court might 
someday have to identify "affirmative limits" imposed on Con-
gress by the "constitutional structure."3 The dissenters consid-
ered the majority's passivity an improper abdication of the 
Court's constitutional duty, and vowed to keep fighting for 
meaningful restraints on federal power.4 
But where were federalist Justices to find "affirmative lim-
its"? The first great problem they faced is the Court's extremely 
expansive interpretation of congressional power under the Inter-
state Commerce Clause. Much federal regulation of the states, as 
of private parties, is imposed pursuant to Commerce Clause au-
thority, which had seemingly become a kind of safe harbor for 
Congress when no other authority could be found. As Justice 
O'Connor recognized in her Garcia dissent, the framers of the 
Constitution believed that the autonomy of the states would be 
protected by the fact that federal powers are "few and defined," 
and that the Commerce Clause in particular would give Con-
gress only a very narrow and limited authority.5 When the Com-
merce Clause was recast by the Court so that the limits became 
few, and congressional power undefined, this change incidentally 
created a threat to the basic structure of federalism. 
Unfortunately, the Garcia dissenters failed to propose a 
clearly workable response to that threat. Justice Powell wanted 
to balance the competing interests of the state and federal gov-
ernments. But his opinion contained no discussion of the federal 
government's interest in the statute at issue in Garcia itself, and 
thus offered no reasoned balancing of the competing interests. 
Justice O'Connor proposed a somewhat different approach, in 
2. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
3. /d. at 556. 
4. See, e.g., id. at 579--SO (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 588--89 (O'Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
5. !d. at 582--S3. 
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which the Court would consider the value of state autonomy an 
important factor in deciding whether a Commerce Clause regu-
lation was consistent with the spirit of the Constitution under the 
McCulloch test.6 Although more promising than Powell's, her 
approach still invited decision by ipse dixit, for it lacked an ana-
lytically definite standard. As we shall see, Scalia's Lane dissent 
suggests an adjustment to O'Connor's approach that could pro-
vide just what is needed. 
The debate about states' rights is closely related to broader 
debates about the Interstate Commerce Clause itself. The Tenth 
Amendment, of course, refers to the reserved rights both of the 
states and of the people. And state autonomy would hardly be 
worth protecting except for the contribution it can make to pre-
serving the liberties of the citizenry. With respect to the Com-
merce Clause, the federalist Justices again insist that an interpre-
tation that gives Congress authority to regulate anything and 
everything that citizens may do is inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion's careful and limited enumeration of powers, and must 
therefore be wrong. And once again, the nationalists have re-
sisted demands for the kind of line-drawing that the federalists 
have sought to undertake. This debate has direct implications for 
the issue in Garcia both because regulations of the states are of-
ten justified by invocations of the Commerce Clause, and be-
cause the state governments' own power to regulate their citi-
zens-or to decide that they should not be regulated-is often 
preempted by federal action under the Commerce Clause. 
Perhaps the most obvious, or na"ive, solution to the whole 
problem would be to restore the original understanding of the 
Commerce Clause. Justice Thomas has argued/ and others have 
confirmed with overwhelming evidence,8 that the Clause was not 
meant to authorize the broad range of federal regulations that 
are now routinely upheld. The term "commerce" in the Consti-
6. As O'Connor pointed out, id. at 584-85, the most expansive extensions of Con-
gress' Commerce Clause power have been based on the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
which has traditionally been governed by the test established in McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 u.s. 316,421 (1819): 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are con-
stitutional. 
7. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-93 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
8. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. 
L. REV. 1387 (1987); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 
68 U. Ou. L. REV. 101 (2001); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning 
of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003). 
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tution refers to buying, selling, and bartering, and transportation 
for the purpose of trade, and the Interstate Commerce Clause 
only authorizes regulation of commerce "among the several 
states." The Court has mistakenly extended the Clause far be-
yond its terms on the specious ground that regulating non-
commercial and intrastate activities is necessary and proper be-
cause they may "affect" interstate commerce. 
With the exception of Thomas himself, nobody on the Su-
preme Court seems to have the slightest inclination to resurrect 
the original meaning of the Commerce Clause. Why not? Stare 
decisis! Or, perhaps more precisely, a deep fear that reinstating 
the Constitution's restrictions on congressional power would in-
terfere with too many well-established and politically popular 
federal programs, and thereby create a political backlash that 
would embarrass the Justices.9 Rather than entertain any idea so 
scary as that, the Court has carved out a series of small excep-
tions to the virtually plenary police power that Congress had 
been allowed to acquire. These well-known developments re-
quire only a brief summary. 
• In United States v. Lopez,10 the Court suddenly articu-
lated a limit on the well-established principle that Con-
gress could regulate wholly intrastate activities with no 
discernable effects on interstate commerce if the aggre-
gate effect of the class of targeted activities would sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce. Henceforth, this 
"aggregation" technique may not be used to justify stat-
utes having "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort 
of economic enterprise,"11 a conclusion confirmed in 
United States v. Morrison. 12 
• In a series of decisions beginning with Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida,13 the Court has concluded that respect 
for the dignity of the states requires that they be immu-
nized from private suits for money damages in actions 
based on federallaw. 14 
9. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court as an 
institution and the legal system as a whole have an immense stake in the stability of our 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has evolved to this point."). 
10. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
11. !d. at 561. 
12. 529 u.s. 598 (2000). 
13. 517 u.s. 44 (1996). 
14. The early cases in this line featured a prolix debate about the original meaning 
of the Constitution on the issue of the states' sovereign immunity. See Seminole Tribe, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999}. Although I believe that the 
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• In New York v. United States/5 the Court held that Con-
gress may not "commandeer" the legislative processes of 
the states by directly compelling them to enact and en-
force a federal regulatory program. 
• In Printz v. United States,16 this anti-commandeering 
principle was extended so as to forbid Congress from or-
dering state executive officials to administer a federal 
regulatory program. 
Except for the 6-3 decision in New York, these were all 5-4 deci-
sions.17 And just as the federalist dissenters in Garcia refused to 
accept defeat, so the nationalist dissenters in these cases have 
vowed to continue a fight in which they expect eventually to 
prevail.18 Notwithstanding the highly charged nature of the de-
bates within the Court, however, the practical importance of 
these new limitations and immunities appears to be slight, and 
their potential to evolve into meaningful restraints on federal 
power is highly questionable. 
• The reach of Lopez and Morrison may turn out to be ex-
tremely narrow. That at least appears to be the implica-
tion of the 6-3 decision in Gonzales v. Raich/9 which 
seems to limit Lopez and Morrison to cases where "a 
particular statute or provision [falls] outside Congress' 
commerce power in its entirety. "20 In Raich itself, Con-
gress imposed a nearly total ban on the cultivation or 
possession of marijuana, and the Court upheld the appli-
cation of this ban to homegrown marijuana whose use 
was specifically authorized for medical purposes by state 
law: "Congress had a rational basis for concluding that 
leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal con-
Constitution requires that congressional power to regulate the states be sharply curtailed, 
I also think that the nationalist dissenters offered some powerful arguments about the 
treatment of sovereign immunity in the original Constitution and the Eleventh Amend-
ment. The Court's most recent decision leaves the details of this debate behind, and as-
sumes that the Framers constitutionalized a far-reaching principle of sovereign immunity 
because of solicitude for the dignity of the states. See Federal Maritime Comm'n v. South 
Carolina State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
15. 505 u.s. 144 (1992). 
16. 521 u.s. 898 (1997). 
17. The more federalist members of the Court during this period were Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas; the more nationalist 
members were Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Shortly after joining the 
Court, Souter joined the federalist majority in New York v. United States, but he thereaf-
ter became a reliable member of the nationalist wing. 
18. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 814 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
19. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
20. /d. at 2209 (emphasis added). 
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trol would [substantiallzr] affect price and market condi-
tions [in other states]." As Justice O'Connor Goined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas) pointed out 
in dissent, this decision "gives Congress a perverse incen-
tive to legislate broadly pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause-nestling questionable assertions of its authority 
into comprehensive regulatory schemes-rather than 
with precision, "22 and thus "is tantamount to removing 
meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause."23 
This is not to deny the majority's entirely plausible 
claim that its decision is a straightforward application of 
Wickard v. Filburn,24 which upheld a regulation limiting 
the cultivation of wheat for home consumption on the 
ground that the aggregate effect of such intrastate activi-
ties could alter the price of wheat in interstate markets. 
As Justice Thomas incisively pointed out ten years ago: 
The aggregation principle [exemplified in Wickard] 
is clever, but has no stopping point. ... Under our 
jurisprudence, if Congress passed an omnibus "sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce" statute, pur-
porting to regulate every aspect of human existence, 
the Act apparently would be constitutional. Even 
though particular sections may govern only trivial 
activities, the statute in the aggregate regulates mat-
ters that substantially affect commerce.25 
• Even without responding to the incentives provided by 
Raich, Congress may still find it easy to target the kinds 
of non-economic intrastate activities at issue in Lopez 
and Morrsion. Lopez itself, for example, invalidated a 
federal statute forbidding the possession of firearms near 
elementary and secondary schools. Congress then reen-
acted the same regulation, with a new (but practically 
rather unimportant) proviso that it applies only to fire-
arms that have moved through interstate commerce at 
some time in the past.26 
21. ld. at 2207. 
22 /d. at 2221. 
23. /d. at 2222. 
24. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
25. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 6~1 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
26. The amended statute was upheld in United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th 
Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1091 (2000). 
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• The sovereign immunity decisions do not exempt the 
states from the obligation to obey any federal laws, and 
they leave the federal government completely free to en-
force those laws. Even in the limited context of private 
suits against the states, the states are immunized only 
from actions for money damages, leaving private parties 
free to sue for equitable relief. 
• The anti-commandeering principle applies only to fed-
eral laws that directly order state officials to carry out 
federal programs. New York illustrates how relatively in-
significant this limitation probably is. In the statute at is-
sue in that case, Congress had sought to induce the states 
to provide new sites for the disposal of low-level radioac-
tive waste. The Court invalidated a provision that com-
pelled the states either to enact legislation providing for 
the disposal of all internally generated radioactive waste 
by a date certain or take title to the waste and thereby 
become liable for any damages suffered by the genera-
tors as a result of the state's failure to ensure its disposal. 
Two other provisions of the statute, which had the same 
purpose (creating incentives for states to establish new 
disposal sites) and which were not obviously less effica-
cious, were upheld. One provision authorized states with 
waste disposal sites to impose a surcharge on incoming 
waste, and funneled some of this tax to other states that 
made progress in creating new sites. Another provision 
allowed states with disposal sites to raise the price of ac-
cepting waste from out of state, and eventually to deny 
access to such incoming waste. These provisions were 
upheld as valid exercises of congressional authority to 
regulate interstate commerce and to spend federal 
money. As this example suggests, federal authority under 
the Commerce Clause and the so-called Spending Clause 
is so broad and flexible that Congress should be able 
rather easily to induce the states to take virtually any ac-
tion that New York and Printz forbid the federal legisla-
ture to command directly. 
Thus, at least in its current state, the Court's jurisprudence might 
be described as fig-leaf federalism. The Court has embraced the 
proposition that the principle of federalism necessarily entails 
some limits on the national government's power, but those limits 
seem almost entirely symbolic in nature. 
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II. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT 
IN TENNESSEE v. LANE 
[Vol. 22:11 
In yet another strand of the recent federalism revival, the 
Court has imposed new limits on congressional authority under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: "The 
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article." In City of Boerne v. Flores,n Con-
gress had forbidden the states to adopt certain generally appli-
cable state laws burdening the free exercise of religion, and had 
defined the class of forbidden laws differently than the Supreme 
Court had defined them in its most recent First Amendment de-
cision.28 Assuming the long-established proposition that the First 
Amendment is "incorporated" into the Fourteenth Amendment 
through substantive due process, and is thus enforceable under 
Section 5, the Boerne Court held that Congress is not free to de-
cide what the First and Fourteenth Amendments mean: "Con-
gress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what 
the right is."29 The Court, however, had previously permitted 
Congress to exercise its Section 5 enforcement authority against 
state laws that did not themselves violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in order to remedy or prevent such violations of 
the Constitution.30 In Boerne, the Court reaffirmed this expan-
sive interpretation of Section 5, but held that there "must be a 
congruence and proportionality between the [constitutional] in-
jury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end."31 
In a series of post-Boerne decisions, the five more federalist 
Justices joined together to invalidate several federal statutes on 
the ground that they flunked this "congruence and proportional-
ity" test. One of those cases, Board of Trustees of the University 
of Alabama v. Garrett,32 held that sovereign immunity protects 
the states from actions for money damages under Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating against disabled persons in certain 
27. 521 u.s. 507 (1997). 
28. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even 
when not supported by a compelling governmental interest. This holding replaced the 
Court's previous test, which did require a compelling governmental interest, and the 
statute challenged in City of Boerne sought to restore the pre-Smith test. 
29. 521 U.S. at 519. 
30. E.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
31. 521 U.S. at 520. 
32. 531 u.s. 356 (2001). 
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circumstances. Although Section 5 authorizes Congress to abro-
gate this immunity, it does so only when the abrogating legisla-
tion exhibits the requisite "congruence and proportionality." 
The Garrett Court relied on precedent for the proposition that 
discrimination against the disabled is forbidden by Section 1 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment only when it cannot survive rational 
basis review, and concluded a) that Congress had failed to iden-
tify a pattern of conduct by the states that would be held uncon-
stitutional under this standard of review, and b) that the ADA 
forbids a wide range of discriminatory conduct that would sur-
vive rational-basis review. Several other 5-4 decisions took a 
. il h 33 s1m ar approac . 
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,34 
however, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined 
their four more nationalist colleagues in a decision allowing the 
states' sovereign immunity to be abrogated on the basis of a con-
spicuously strained congruence-and-proportionality analysis.35 
Then, in Tennessee v. Lane/6 the Court sustained an action for 
money damages against a state under Title II of the ADA, which 
forbids certain forms of discrimination against the disabled in 
public services, programs, and activities. Lane involved a claim 
of discrimination arising from architectural features of a court 
house that obstructed access by people with certain physical dis-
abilities. The Court decided that the statute met the congruence 
and proportionality test, at least insofar as it served to protect 
the Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, along with Justices Kennedy and Thomas, 
dissented on the ground that the majority had misapplied the 
congruence and proportionality test. Justice Scalia also dis-
sented, but his solo opinion went much further. 
Disclosing that he had joined the Boerne majority only 
"with some misgiving,"37 Scalia contended that Hibbs and Lane 
demonstrated that the congruence and proportionality test, "like 
all such flabby tests, is a standing invitation to judicial arbitrari-
33. Other cases in which challenged statutes were invalidated under the congru-
ence-and-proportionality test include: Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. 
v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000); and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Like Garrett, all of these 
5-4 decisions featured the typical federalist/nationalist lineup. 
34. 538 u.s. 721 (2003). 
35. !d. Rehnquist himself wrote the majority opinion. Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas 
dissented. 
36. 541 u.s. 509 (2004). 
37. !d. at 556. 
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ness and policy-driven decisionmaking."38 As an alternative, 
Scalia proposed to adopt the bright-line rule actually specified 
by Section 5: Congress would be authorized to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment itself, but not to enact "prophylactic legisla-
tion" outlawing state actions that the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not forbid. A very interesting wrinkle in Scalia's proposal 
was an exception to this bright-line rule for Section 5 legislation 
aimed at racial discrimination. Scalia framed this exception as a 
concession to the principle of stare decisis, noting that many im-
portant and well-accepted racial discrimination statutes assumed 
the validity of prophylactic legislation, and emphasizing that the 
recent Hibbs decision was the first to uphold a prophylactic 
measure outside that limited context. In addition, Scalia stressed 
that racial discrimination was the principal evil at which the 
Equal Protection Clause was aimed, suggesting that an expan-
sive reading of Section 5 in this limited context was both appro-
priate and appropriately limited. The result: a clearly defined 
limit on congressional power under Section 5, modified only by a 
clearly defined exception that is consistent with the Fourteenth 
Amendment's principal purpose. 
III. A TENTH AMENDMENT EXCEPTION TO 
THE EXPAND ED SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL 
REGULATORY POWER 
Mutatis mutandi, this same approach could be applied more 
generally to federalism issues. Thus, for example, the Court's 
expansive interpretation of the Interstate Commerce Clause 
could be left in place insofar as it applies to private parties, pri-
marily for reasons of stare decisis. With respect to congressional 
regulation of the states themselves, however, the Court could re-
vive the original meaning of the Clause, and hold such regula-
tions invalid unless they constitute the regulation of interstate 
commerce itself. This is a bright-line rule, under which Congress 
would be forbidden to use its Commerce Clause authority to 
regulate any activities carried out by a state (or its agencies and 
political subdivisions) unless those activities constituted buying, 
selling, or bartering with out-of-state parties, or transportation 
across state lines for purposes of trade. This variation or exten-
sion of Scalia's position in Lane may be understood as an elabo-
ration or further specification of O'Connor's "spirit of the Con-
stitution" proposal in her Garcia dissent. 
38. !d. at 557-58. 
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This doctrinal move could have several useful effects. First, 
it would create the kind of protected sphere of state autonomy 
that the Garcia dissenters, and many others as well, have be-
lieved is an enduringly important characteristic of our constitu-
tional structure. Second, it would do so without diminishing in 
any significant way the broad authority Congress now routinely 
exercises over the private sector and the national economy. 
Congressional authority over private actors would be untouched, 
and Congress could continue to regulate the states themselves 
when their governments actually engage in interstate commerce. 
Third, the Court would have the opportunity to develop a new 
kind of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, one much more faith-
ful to the original meaning of the Constitution, in a limited con-
text where it is unlikely to produce politically intolerable results. 
Fourth, the development of this line of case law might provide 
new information about the political risks of imposing meaningful 
constraints on congressional power over the private sector. Fifth, 
in case the political risks of major doctrinal changes in the con-
text of private sector regulation someday become, or appear to 
become, smaller than today's Justices believe they are, the new 
line of case law would be available to guide those changes. 
It is, of course, possible that the proposal made here could 
also produce some undesirable effects. Because the states would 
be freed from some federal regulations that would continue to 
apply to private parties, we would see a new economic incentive 
for states to begin carrying out functions that would otherwise be 
left to the private sector. It is doubtful, however, that these in-
centives would be sufficient to counterbalance, to any significant 
degree, the efficiency advantages that are generally assumed to 
make the private sector the preferred provider of most commer-
cial functions. If a significant migration of functions from the 
private to the public sector did occur, the most obvious inference 
would be that federal regulation of the private sector had be-
come quite excessive, which in turn would suggest that Congress 
ought to cut back on such regulations. And maybe that would 
happen. If, however, Congress considered it imperative to main-
tain high levels of regulation, and found that competition from 
the newly freed states was undermining its efforts, it would al-
ways have the old-fashioned option of initiating a genuine con-
stitutional amendment under Article V. 
Raich provides a good illustration of the more likely effects 
of the proposal made in this paper. In that case, Congress had 
banned the private cultivation and possession of marijuana in re-
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sponse to a national political consensus that opposed the recrea-
tional use of this substance. Decades later, California and several 
other states attempted to create a narrow exception from this 
ban in order to allow physicians to treat their patients with 
therapeutic doses of the drug. Under this paper's proposed 
modification of Commerce Clause doctrine, California would 
still not be able to authorize the private cultivation and distribu-
tion of marijuana (so the result in Raich would be preserved), 
but California would have the option of creating a government 
program for cultivating and distributing marijuana for medical 
uses. Even the Raich majority, which thought that California's 
effort to relieve unnecessary suffering among its citizens had no 
legal basis, found the case "difficult" and the result of its own 
decision "troubling. "39 Unless state governments were to begin 
behaving in a fashion considerably more irresponsible than Cali-
fornia did in this case, the need for a constitutional ban on such 
"novel social and economic experiments"40 is less than apparent. 
The doctrinal move suggested in this paper would also need 
to be extended to the Court's jurisprudence of the spending 
power, which is based on this constitutional provision: "The 
Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Im-
posts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States." James 
Madison famously interpreted this to mean that Congress is au-
thorized to appropriate money only for programs separately au-
thorized by one of its enumerated powers. In the notoriously 
muddled Butler opinion in 1936,41 the Court purported to reject 
Madison's eminently plausible interpretation, and to adopt the 
contrary view of Hamilton and Story, according to which the 
only limit on congressional spending authority is that appropria-
tions must be for the general welfare of the nation. Mysteriously, 
however, the Court interpreted the Hamilton/Story position so 
as to make it seemingly indistinguishable from Madison's. The 
statute at issue in Butler sought to reduce agricultural surpluses 
by subsidizing farmers who agreed to limit production, and But-
ler invalidated the statute on the ground that it "invades the re-
served rights of the states" by seeking to regulate agricultural 
39. 125 S. Ct. 2195,2201 (2005). Ironically, Justice O'Connor, who wrote the princi-
pal dissent in Raich, went out of her way to note that she did not agree with California's 
effort to protect the medical use of marijuana. !d. at 2229. 
40. Id. at 2220 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
41. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
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production, "a matter beyond the powers delegated to the fed-
eral government. "42 
In subsequent cases, the spending power has expanded 
along with Congress' expanding regulatory authority. While con-
tinuing to pay lip service to the proposition that there must be 
limits on the congressional spending power, the Court has not 
yet identified any law that flunks the general welfare test and has 
never again identified a spending provision that invades the re-
served rights of the states.43 Accordingly, even a partial restora-
tion of the original limits on congressional power over the states 
under the Commerce Clause must be matched with a restoration 
of parallel limits on the spending authority. Otherwise, as New 
Y ark v. United States illustrates, the newly revived limits on con-
gressional regulatory power would probably prove illusory.44 
CONCLUSION 
Justice O'Connor opened her Garcia dissent with these 
words: "The Court today surveys the battle scene of federalism 
and sounds a retreat. Like Justice Powell, I would prefer to hold 
the field and, at the very least, render a little aid to the 
wounded. "45 If a victory for federalism would entail a restoration 
of the states to the role that the Constitution gave them, 
42. !d. at 68. 
43. The leading case is South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987), which summa-
rized the Ia w as follows: 
The spending power is of course not unlimited, but is instead subject to several 
general restrictions articulated in our cases. The first of these limitations is de-
rived from the language of the Constitution itself: the exercise of the spending 
power must be in pursuit of "the general welfare." In considering whether a par-
ticular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes, courts should de-
fer substantially to the judgment of Congress. Second, we have required that if 
Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it "must do so 
unambiguously ... , enabl[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly, 
cognizant of the consequences of their participation." Third, our cases have 
suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants 
might be illegitimate if they are unrelated "to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs." Finally, we have noted that other constitutional 
provisions may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal 
funds. 
Id. at 207-08 (italics added; citations omitted). In a footnote to the italicized sentence in 
this passage, the Court mentioned that "[t]he level of deference to the congressional de-
cision is such that the Court has more recently questioned whether 'general welfare' is a 
judicially enforceable restriction at all." /d. at 207 n.2. 
44. For a useful discussion of the importance of finding new limits on congressional 
spending authority as part of any federalism revival, see Ilya Somin, Closing the Pan-
dora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State 
Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002). 
45. 469 U.S. 528,580 (1985). 
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O'Connor held out little hope of ever reaching such a goal. She 
observed that the states' role in our federal system had eroded 
largely through an expansion, unanticipated by the founders, of 
congressional power over domestic affairs, but she gave no sign 
that she believed it would be practicable, or even desirable, for 
the judiciary of our time to restore the original constitutional 
limits on congressional authority over the nation's citizens. In-
stead, she sought to aid the wounded states by contending that 
some Commerce Clause regulations of unquestioned validity 
when applied to private parties could nevertheless be struck 
down when applied to the states themselves, on the ground that 
such regulations violate the spirit of the Constitution. 
With the help of Justice Scalia's Lane dissent, it is now pos-
sible to put this sense of the spirit of the Constitution into a 
more rigorous form. Congressional powers that the Court has 
improperly expanded, such as the power to regulate interstate 
commerce and to spend federal funds, should be restored to 
their original limited scope in all those cases where federal stat-
utes operate on the states themselves. This still amounts only to 
giving "a little aid to the wounded," but it has the advantage of 
tying the spirit of the Constitution directly to the original mean-
ing of specific textual provisions. And if the Court were to "hold 
the field" in this way, it might even prepare the ground for a 
more complete restoration of the constitutional structure some-
day in the future. Such a restoration would undoubtedly have to 
be preceded or accompanied by massive changes in public atti-
tudes toward congressional power, and there is little reason to 
expect such changes to occur anytime soon. But such changes 
are not impossible, and the Court might be able to contribute in 
a small way to making them more likely. 
